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SOLIDARITY ON SOCIAL MEDIA 
Ariana R. Levinson 
As with other technical revolutions before it, such as the 
printing press, radio, and telephone, social media has 
changed the way in which people communicate. Due to cases 
involving the use of social media by employees, among other 
reasons, the often little-known National Labor Relations 
Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) has become the center of national 
media attention. In the cases involving social media, the 
Board simply applies well-established, decades-old legal 
principles. Yet, employers, business groups, and the media 
have portrayed the Board as deviating from long-standing 
precedent, overstepping its role in regulating employment, 
and misunderstanding the impact of social media. However, 
no federal Circuit Court, to which Board decisions are 
appealed, has yet denied enforcement of a Board decision in a 
case involving social media.  
While other scholars have contributed to the buzz 
surrounding the Board’s decisions by arguing that the Board 
has been incorrect to apply its precedent to social media 
because social media differs from prior technology, this 
Article argues that the Board has properly used its wealth of 
expertise gained from many decades of enforcing labor 
management relations to extend its precedent in a flexible 
manner to this new technology. This Article first summarizes 
the Board’s decisions and guidance about employees’ use of 
social media and employer policies regulating the use of 
social media. It then discusses four simple clarifications that 
the Board should make in future decisions in order to make 
its regulation easier for employers and employees to 
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understand and follow. First, the Board should clarify that 
any time more than one employee is involved in a social 
media discussion, the employees act concertedly. Second, the 
Board should clarify that employees act for mutual aid and 
protection when they discuss working conditions, whether or 
not they explicitly focus on improving those conditions. Third, 
the Board should clarify how it will determine when 
employees engaged in otherwise protected concerted activity 
lose the protection of the National Labor Relations Act due to 
the egregious nature of their social media use. Finally, the 
Board should clarify whether provision-specific disclaimers 
providing concrete examples of what constitutes protected 
concerted activity will be effective to render a social media 
policy legal. These clarifications will enhance the likelihood 
of continued enforcement of Board decisions involving social 
media by the Circuit Courts. Moreover, these clarifications 
have not been discussed in articles written by other scholars 
and, thus, contribute to the growing literature on this topic. 
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 “‘Many view social media as the new water cooler,’ said 
Mark G. Pearce, the [National Labor Relations] [B]oard’s 
chairman, noting that federal law has long protected the 
right of employees to discuss work-related matters. ‘All we’re 
doing is applying traditional rules to a new technology.’”1 
 
 “[T]he Board has seen fit to engage in mission creep 
and attempt to micro-manage employers’ workplaces. It has 
done this by declaring what can and what cannot be in 
employer handbooks, even on issues such as social 
media usage. The Board’s recent actions in this area are 
creating a labyrinth of rules that few employers will be able to 
navigate without an army of lawyers. Other benign policies 
that sound perfectly acceptable to any rational person have 
been deemed by the Board to be violations of federal law.”2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Much of the time the National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB” or “Board”) is a little-known agency; the public has 
never heard of it, and even attorneys erroneously believe 
that it deals only with unionized workplaces. But over the 
past few years the Board has become the center of national 
media attention for several reasons, including its ruling in 
the case involving Boeing’s move from a plant in the North to 
one in the South,3 the finding of an Administrative Law 
Judge (“ALJ”) that college athletes constitute employees,4 
 
1 Steven Greenhouse, Even if It Enrages Your Boss, Social Net Speech 
is Protected, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
01/22/technology/employers-social-media-policies-come-under-regulatory-
scrutiny.html?_r=1. 
2 Nathan Mehrens, Conservative Mandate Puts Focus on NLRB 
Abuses, WASH. EXAMINER (Jan. 17, 2015), http://www.washington 
examiner.com/conservative-mandate-puts-focus-on-nlrb-abuses/article/255 
8810 [https://perma.cc/2LF6-33EY]. 
3 Julius G. Getman, Boeing, the IAM, and the NLRB: Why U.S. Labor 
Law is Failing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1651, 1651 (2014) (describing criticism of 
NLRB following NLRB complaint alleging Boeing violated the NLRA). 
4 Steven L. Willborn, College Athletes as Employees: An Overflowing 
Quiver, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 65, 67 (2014) (discussing media attention of 
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and the current case regarding whether employees of a 
McDonald’s franchise are also employees of the corporation.5  
One of the reasons for which the Board has recently 
garnered the most attention is its rulings involving 
employees’ use of social media. These social media cases 
arouse the curiosity of the public because they deal with a 
revolutionary communications technology and have made 
the public aware that the baseline protections in the 
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “Act”) apply as 
equally to non-union workplaces as to unionized ones. As 
early as 1962, the United States Supreme Court recognized 
that employees acting in solidarity to protest unsafe working 
conditions were protected by the Act.6 In cases involving 
social media, the Board simply extends this precedent to 
protect employees engaging in solidarity on social media.7 
Yet employers, business groups, and the media have 
portrayed the Board as deviating from long-standing 
precedent, overstepping its role in regulating employment, 
and misunderstanding the impact of social media.8 Even 
 
the regional NLRB decision that college athletes with scholarships are 
employees). The Board ultimately overruled the ALJ’s finding, declining to 
exercise jurisdiction over the Northwestern team. Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 
No. 167, at *19 (Aug. 17, 2015). 
5 David J. Kaufmann et al., A Franchisor is Not the Employer of Its 
Franchisees or Their Employees, 34 FRANCHISE L.J. 439, 442 (2015) (listing 
criticism and praise of the NLRB General Counsel’s filing of a complaint 
arguing that the employees of McDonald’s franchisees are the employees 
of the franchisor); McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 02-CA-093893 (N.L.R.B. 
filed Nov. 29, 2012), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/02-CA-093893 [https:// 
perma.cc/VMY6-33WD]. The case is still pending in front of an ALJ and is 
expected to take years to reach a conclusion. Lawrence E. Dubé, NLRB 
Election Rules and Major Cases Will Be Closely Watched in 2016, Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at S-27, S-29 (Jan. 25, 2016). 
6 NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 12–13 (1962). 
7 Ariana R. Levinson, Labor Law Issues: Employer Social Media 
Policies; Disciplining Employees for Social Media Postings, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW (John A. Rothchild ed., 
forthcoming 2016) (draft on file with author). 
8 Kevin A. Fritz & Craig B. Simonsen, NLRB, Social Media, and 
Employee Handbooks (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.laborandemployment 
lawcounsel.com/2015/12/nlrb-social-media-and-employee-handbooks/ 
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Congress recently considered budget cuts to the Board due to 
what it views as the Board’s unwarranted activist role in 
protecting employees.9 However, no federal Circuit Court, to 
which Board decisions are appealed, has yet denied 
enforcement of a Board decision in a case involving social 
media. 
Indeed, the Board has done an admirable job of applying 
well-established, decades-old legal principles designed to 
protect collective action and level the playing field between 
employees and employers. While other scholars have 
contributed to the buzz surrounding the Board’s decisions by 
arguing that the Board has been incorrect to apply its 
precedent to social media because the technology differs from 
prior technology,10 this Article argues that the Board has 
 
[https://perma.cc/F5NC-T3DK]; Larry Marquess, How to Cope with an 
Aggressive NLRB, https://www.nfib.com/webinars/nlrb/ [https://perma.cc/ 
3R5Y-4XHB]; U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THEATER OF THE ABSURD: THE 
NLRB TAKES ON THE EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK 4, 20 (Dec. 2015), 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/nlrb_theate
r_of_the_absurd.pdf [https://perma.cc/39UZ-U6S8]; Sarah S. Merkel, 
Trials and Tribulations: Second Circuit Upholds NLRB Social Media 
Ruling, N.Y. DAILY RECORD (Nov. 4, 2015), http://nydailyrecord.com/blog/ 
2015/11/04/trials-tribulations-second-circuit-upholds-nlrb-social-media-
ruling/ [https://perma.cc/LKR8-Y928]; Greenhouse, supra note 1. 
9 Dubé, supra note 5, at S-27 (noting that appropriation for 2016 
passed “without several riders that would have curbed the board’s 
authority”); Cole Stangler, In Budget Proposal Riddled With Anti-Union 
Measures, House Republicans Take Aim at National Labor Relations Board, INT’L 
BUS. TIMES (June 25, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/budget-proposal-riddled-anti-
union-measures-house-republicans-take-aim-national-labor-1983941 [https://per 
ma.cc/9QHG-W9AM]; Connor D. Wolf, Republicans Have a New Plan to Stop 
Obama’s Labor Board, DAILY CALLER (June 17, 2015), http://www.dailycaller.com/ 
2015/06/17/despite-recent-failures-republicans-have-a-new-plan-to-stop-the-nlrb 
[https://perma.cc/5PKR-RBL2]; Chris Opfer, Subcommittees Clear Spending 
Bills With Labor Policy Riders, Cuts to NLRB, 29 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA), at 
1279 (June 23, 2015), http://laborandemploymentlaw.bna.com/lerc/2455/ 
split_display.adp?fedfid=71317507&vname=lrwnotallissues&jd=a0g8r0t4g
2&split=0 [https://perma.cc/ZUH6-MNNS]. 
10 Lauren R. Younkins, #ihatemyboss: Rethinking the NLRB’s 
Approach to Social Media Policies, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 222, 
224 (2013) (arguing that “the NLRB’s approach fails to recognize the 
unique nature of conversing over social media”); Regina Robson, 
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“Friending” the NLRB: The Connection Between Social Media, “Concerted 
Activities” and Employer Interests, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 81, 85, 
121 (2013) (noting that “social media communications are a shotgun blast 
directed to broad categories of ‘friends’ who may include family, co-workers 
and even supervisors and managers”); Natalie J. Ferrall, Comment, 
Concerted Activity and Social Media: Why Facebook Is Nothing Like the 
Proverbial Water Cooler, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (2013) (arguing that 
NLRB precedent is “inadequate to address the distinct qualities of social 
media”); Andrew Metcalf, Note, “Concert” or Solo Gig? Where the NLRB 
Went Wrong When It Linked in to Social Networks, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1543, 1575 (2013) (arguing that social media posts deserve less protection 
under the NLRA than other forms of publicly visible concerted activity by 
employees); David L. Bayer, Note, Employers are Not Friends with 
Facebook: How the NLRB is Protecting Employees’ Social Media Activity, 7 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 169, 171 (2012) (arguing that “the NLRB 
misapplies old law to a new and distinct context”); Colin M. Leonard & 
Tyler T. Hendry, From Peoria to Peru: NLRB Doctrine in a Social Media 
World, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 199, 200 (2013) (arguing that the NLRB’s 
application of precedent “fails to appropriately acknowledge the very 
nature of social media”); Rebecca Stang, Comment, I Get By with a Little 
Help from My “Friends”: How the National Labor Relations Board 
Misunderstands Social Media, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 621, 623–24, 638 (2013) 
(arguing that ALJs and general counsel have failed to account for “the 
differences between social media communications and real-life 
conversations”); Lauren K. Neal, Note, The Virtual Water Cooler and the 
NLRB: Concerted Activity in the Age of Facebook, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1715, 1749 (2012) (arguing that the Board has applied the “concerted 
activity standard” to cases involving social media in a problematic way); 
Ariana C. Green, Note, Using Social Networking to Discuss Work: NLRB 
Protection for Derogatory Employee Speech and Concerted Activity, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 837, 841 (2012) (“Failing to recognize the differences 
between online and offline communications has created discordant legal 
rulings.”); Kimberly Bielan, Note, All A-“Twitter”: The Buzz Surrounding 
Ranting on Social-Networking Sites and Its Ramification on the 
Employment Relationship, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 155, 155 (2011) (arguing 
that because of the “unique public nature of social-networking sites” 
posting expletives about an employer should not constitute protected 
concerted activity). Cf. Nicholas H. Meza, Comment, A New Approach for 
Clarity in the Determination of Protected Concerted Activity Online, 45 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 329, 366 (2013) (proposing a bright-line rule to deal with the 
advances in social media to which the NLRA must adapt). 
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properly used its wealth of expertise gained from many 
decades of enforcing labor management relations to extend 
its precedent in a flexible manner to this technology.11 
This Article first summarizes the Board’s decisions and 
guidance regarding employees’ use of social media and 
employer policies regulating the use of social media. It then 
discusses four simple clarifications that the Board should 
make in future decisions to make its regulation easier for 
employers and employees to understand and follow. First, 
the Board should clarify that any time more than one 
employee is involved in a social media discussion, the 
employees are acting in concert. Second, the Board should 
clarify that employees are acting for mutual aid and 
protection when they discuss working conditions, whether or 
not they explicitly focus on improving those conditions. 
Third, the Board should clarify how it will determine when 
employees engaged in otherwise protected concerted activity 
lose the protection of the Act due to the egregious nature of 
their social media use. Finally, the Board should clarify 
whether provision-specific disclaimers providing concrete 
examples of what constitutes protected concerted activity 
will be effective to render a social media policy legal. These 
clarifications will enhance the likelihood of continued 
enforcement of Board decisions involving social media by the 
Circuit Courts. Moreover, these clarifications have not been 
discussed in articles written by other scholars and, thus, 
contribute to the growing literature on this topic.12 
 
11 Levinson, supra note 7. Cf. Michael Z. Green, The NLRB as an 
Überagency for the Evolving Workplace, 64 EMORY L.J. 101 (2015); Jeffrey 
M. Hirsch, Worker Collective Action in the Digital Age, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 
921, 937 (2015) (“Although electronic communications may be more prone 
to implicate questions of concertedness, the NLRB’s current analysis 
remains well-equipped to handle these questions.”).  
12 Cf. Elizabeth Allen, Note, You Can’t Say That on Facebook: The 
NLRA’s Opprobriousness Standard and Social Media, 45 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 195, 213 (2014) (arguing that the Board should apply Atlantic Steel 
with certain modifications to determine when an employee loses the 
protection of the Act); Ann C. McGinley & Ryan P. McGinley-Stempel, 
Beyond the Water Cooler: Speech and the Workplace in an Era of Social 
Media, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 75, 114–15 (2012) (arguing that an 
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II. BOARD REGULATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
ACTIVITY AND POLICIES 
The Board has applied its precedent to find that 
employees who have posted on social media are protected 
from discharge and discipline for their activities when they 
engage in protected concerted activity.13 The Board has also 
applied its precedent to find employer social media policies 
that chill employees from engaging in protected concerted 
activity unlawful.14 
The NLRA guarantees employees “the right to self-
organization . . . and to engage in other concerted activities 
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid 
 
individual post where the employee speaks on behalf of other employees, 
or seeks to gather information from co-workers, should be protected, and 
that one case incorrectly characterized a discussion on social media as 
mere griping when it concerned the terms of employment); Stang, supra 
note 10, at 647–48 (arguing that the NLRB “must provide a clear 
indication of what distinguishes an individual gripe from legitimate 
concerted activity” and proposing that the NLRB focus on whether the 
post raises a “global employment issue” or is “just an individual 
frustration over an embarrassing work moment”); Neal, supra note 10, at 
1756–57 (proposing factor-based test for concertedness and “a more 
stringent loss-of-protection standard”); Robert Sprague, Facebook Meets 
the NLRB: Employee Online Communications and Unfair Labor Practices, 
14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 957, 998 (2012) (reasoning that protected concerted 
activity requires posts related to employment that are an outgrowth of 
employee’s collective concerns, discussion by employees, and evidence that 
the posting employee was seeking to induce group action); Green, supra 
note 10, at 838 (citing NLRB’s webpage for the proposition that “an 
employer cannot fire an employee solely because she discusses topics such 
as management or salary with fellow employees, even if in a public 
forum”). 
13 Levinson, supra note 7; Design Technology Group, LLC d/b/a Bettie 
Page Clothing, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 96, at *1 (Apr. 19, 2013), aff’d, 361 
N.L.R.B. No. 79 (Oct. 31, 2014); Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 
N.L.R.B. No. 37, at *2 (Dec. 14, 2012); BaySys Technologies, 357 N.L.R.B. 
No. 28, at *1–2 (Aug. 2, 2011). 
14 Levinson, supra note 7; Alternative Cmty. Living, Inc., 362 N.L.R.B 
No. 55, at *1–2 (Mar. 31, 2015); Target Corp., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 103, at *2 
n.6 (Apr. 26, 2013); Boch Imports, Inc. d/b/a Boch Honda, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 
83, at *10 (Apr. 30, 2015). 
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or protection.”15 It is a violation of the Act for an employer to 
interfere with these Section 7 rights.16 Under long-standing 
precedent, employees act concertedly when two or more 
employees have a discussion or take action together.17 Under 
equally well-established precedent, an employee acts 
concertedly when the employee’s action results from prior 
collective action, when the employee acts alone but as a 
representative of other employees, and when an employee 
acts alone to initiate group action.18 Collective conduct is for 
mutual aid or protection when it concerns terms and 
conditions of employment.19 However, conduct that is found 
to be concerted action for mutual aid or protection can 
nonetheless lose protection under the Act if found to be 
egregious in nature. The Board has found that threats of 
violence, insubordination, defamation,20 disloyalty, or 
disparagement of an employer’s product21 constitute reasons 
that an employee will lose the protection of the Act. 
Protection for employees extends to being free from 
employer policies that restrict the exercise of Section 7 
rights. The Board has long held that an employer policy that 
explicitly restricts Section 7 rights is unlawful.22 Equally 
 
15 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
16 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an 
employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the 
exercise of the rights guaranteed in [Section 7].”). 
17 Meyers Indus. (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 493 (1984), remanded 
by Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
18 Meyers Indus. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 886–88 (1986); Mobil 
Exploration & Producing U.S., Inc. v. NLRB, 200 F.3d 230, 238 (5th Cir. 
1999) (acknowledging that “it is now well recognized that an individual 
employee may be engaged in concerted activity when he acts alone” in 
circumstances that include when a single employee acts to induce group 
action, as a representative of co-workers, or as a “logical outgrowth” of 
concerted activity) (citations omitted). 
19 Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 564 (1978). 
20 Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 
53, 64–65 (1966). 
21 NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers 
(Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 471, 473 (1953). 
22 Martin Luther Memorial Home, Inc. d/b/a Lutheran Heritage 
Village-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 646 (2004). 
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well-established is the principle that even if a policy does not 
explicitly restrict Section 7 rights, it will be found unlawful 
in three circumstances: (1) if the policy is implemented as a 
response to employees’ engaging in protected concerted 
activity; (2) if the policy is implemented in a manner which 
prohibits Section 7 activity; or (3) if the policy would be 
reasonably construed by employees to prohibit them from 
engaging in some type of protected concerted activity.23 
Because the employer drafts the policy, ambiguities are 
construed against the employer.24 
The Board has extended this long-standing doctrine to the 
social media forum.25 The Board has found that employees 
who have discussions on social media, such as Facebook, act 
in concert with one another.26 It has also found that when an 
employee posts comments that follow up on prior group 
employee meetings or protests, such comments are 
concerted.27 Social media activity is not concerted, however, 
when the employee simply posts about a work incident, such 
as an automobile accident at a car dealership event.28 
The Board has also found that employees act for mutual 
aid and protection when the objective intent of their social 
media comments is to seek better terms and conditions of 
employment, such as a safer work environment29 or greater 
commissions.30 Additionally, the Board has held that 
discussions on social media among employees that concern 
 
23 Id. at 647. 
24 Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB 
Div. of Advice, to Dorothy L. Moore-Duncan, Reg’l Dir., Region 4 regarding 
U.S. Security Associates, Inc., No. 4-CA-66069, at 2–3 (Aug. 13, 2012). 
25 See Levinson, supra note 7. 
26 Design Technology Group, LLC d/b/a Bettie Page Clothing, 359 
N.L.R.B. No. 96, at *1 (Apr. 19, 2013), aff’d, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 79, at *1 
(Oct. 31, 2014); Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 
*2 (Dec. 14, 2012); BaySys Technologies, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 28, at *1–2 
(Aug. 2, 2011). 
27 Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at *1, *10 (Sept. 28, 
2012); Pier Sixty, LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, at *2 (Mar. 31, 2014). 
28 Karl Knauz, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at *10–11. 
29 See Bettie Page, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 96, at *1. 
30 Karl Knauz, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at *1, *10. 
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terms and conditions of employment are for mutual aid or 
protection.31 
Finally, the Board has held that one instance of employee 
conduct on social media lost the protection of the Act, while 
explaining in several other instances why social media 
conduct was not so egregious as to lose the protection of the 
Act. Under long-standing precedent, concerted activity for 
mutual aid and protection loses the protection of the Act only 
when it “is so egregious as to take it outside the protection of 
the Act, or of such a character as to render the employee 
unfit for further service.”32 In one social media case, 
employees lost the protection of the Act because they were 
advocating insubordination, such as refusing to follow 
employer rules and “neglecting their duties.”33 The Board, 
however, has found that social media comments critical of 
supervisors do not lose the protection of the Act when they 
do not go so far as to disparage the employer’s products.34 
The Board has also explained that use of profanity on social 
media generally does not rise to the level of egregiousness 
necessary to lose the protection of the Act.35 Finally, the 
Board has explained that when an employee makes 
statements believed to be true, such as statements about 
safety violations or failures to provide pay on time, these 
 
31 Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at *2–3; BaySys 
Technologies, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 28, at *1–2. 
32 Anheuser–Busch, Inc. v. NLRB, 338 F.3d 267, 280 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Consumers Power Co., 282 N.L.R.B. 130, 132 (1986)); see also 
Stanford New York, LLC, 344 N.L.R.B. 558, 558 (2005); Media Gen. 
Operations, Inc. v. NLRB, 394 F.3d 207, 212–13 (4th Cir. 2005); Sullair 
P.T.O., Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 500, 502 (7th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. White 
Oak Manor, 452 F. App’x 374, 382 (4th Cir. 2011). 
33 Richmond Dist. Neighborhood Ctr., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 74, at *2–3 
(Oct. 28, 2014). 
34 Three D, LLC, d/b/a Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, 361 N.L.R.B. 
No. 31, at *5 (Aug. 22, 2014); N.Y. Party Shuttle, LLC, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 
112, at *2, *5 (May 2, 2013). 
35 Triple Play Sports Bar, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31, at *4 n.17; Pier Sixty, 
LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, at *4 (Mar. 31, 2015). 
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communications do not rise to the level of knowing or 
reckless dishonesty required for proving defamation.36 
As to employer social media policies, the Board has also 
described how its precedent applies.37 Social media policies 
that are overbroad because employees could reasonably 
construe them to prohibit protected concerted activity are 
unlawful.38 The Board has found prohibitions on sharing 
personnel or confidential information on social media to be 
unlawful when those policies do not clarify that employees 
may share wage information and information about other 
terms and conditions of employment.39 The Board has also 
found prohibitions on disparagement and defamation to be 
unlawful when they are not defined precisely enough to 
clarify that the prohibited conduct does not include 
statements critical of supervisors or management.40 
Additionally, the Board has found that a policy requiring 
employees to identify themselves when posting on social 
media to be unlawful because employees have a right not to 
identify themselves when discussing wages and other terms 
and conditions of employment.41 Furthermore, a general 
disclaimer stating that a social media policy does not 
 
36 N.Y. Party Shuttle, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 112, at *1–2, *5. 
37 See generally Levinson, supra note 7 (discussing Board precedent 
on social media policies). 
38 Alternative Cmty. Living, Inc., 362 N.L.R.B No. 55, at *1, *16 (Mar. 
31, 2015); Target Corp., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 103, at *23 (Apr. 26, 2013); Boch 
Imports, Inc. d/b/a Boch Honda, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 83, at *1–2 (Apr. 30, 
2015). 
39 Alternative Cmty. Living, 362 N.L.R.B No. 55, at *1, *17–18; Target 
Corp., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 103, at *23. 
40 Dish Network Corp., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 108, at *1 n.1, *5 (Apr. 30, 
2013); see also Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 106, at *1–2 
(Sept. 7, 2012) (holding unlawful a policy prohibiting posts that damage 
the company), vacated, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 14895 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1, 
2012) (citing NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014)); Alternative 
Cmty. Living, 362 N.L.R.B No. 55, at *18 (holding unlawful a policy 
prohibiting posts that affront others’ dignity). 
41 Boch Honda, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 83, at *2. 
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prohibit conduct made lawful by the Act will not suffice to 
render an otherwise unlawful policy lawful.42 
Thus, the application of Board precedent to social media 
cases is generally straightforward and understandable to 
employers and employees alike. There are, however, a few 
items the Board could clarify to improve understanding of its 
precedent for employers, employees, and the public, and to 
increase the continued likelihood of enforcement of its social 
media cases by the Circuit Courts. 
III. CONCERTED ACTIVITY 
While in most cases addressing social media and other 
collective action the involvement of more than one employee 
makes the concerted nature of the activity apparent,43 in 
some cases only one employee is involved.44 When one 
employee posts to social media, the employee may be doing 
so as an outgrowth of prior concerted activity, as a 
representative of other employees, or in order to encourage 
other employees to speak up or take action.45 On the other 
hand, the employee may not be relating to co-workers at 
 
42 Alternative Cmty. Living, 362 N.L.R.B No. 55, at *1, *19. 
43 See generally Meyers Indus. (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 493 
(1984) (discussing concept of concerted activity), remanded by Prill v. 
NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also NLRB v. Main St. Terrace 
Care Ctr., 218 F.3d 531, 540 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding employee’s statement 
concerted because made during conversation with another employee 
regarding unionization); Jhirmack Enters., 283 N.L.R.B. 609, 609 n.2, 
614–15 (1987) (reasoning that employee telling another employee to take 
action to preserve his job is concerted). 
44 See generally Meyers Indus. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 886–88 
(1986) (discussing cases addressing when individual conduct is concerted 
activity). 
45 See id.; see also Fotomat Corp., 207 N.L.R.B. 461, 463 (1973) 
(holding that a single employee was participating in concerted activity 
when, in her role as union spokesperson, she voiced her own complaints 
and those of other employees to a supervisor), enforced, 497 F.2d 901 (6th 
Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Caval Tool Div., Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 262 
F.3d 184, 189–90 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a single employee’s actions 
were concerted where she spoke out at a company meeting about a new 
break policy by questioning and challenging the policy with comments 
designed to induce group action), enforcing 331 N.L.R.B. 858 (2000). 
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all.46 In these instances, the Board must draw a line between 
individual action and collective action. 
The line can sometimes be blurry, and in social media 
cases, different Board members have different thoughts 
about what constitutes concerted activity.47 Recognizing 
someone is aggrieved is a necessary predicate to taking 
collective action. Conferring with other co-workers, or having 
a discussion with them, is also a necessary predicate to 
taking any collective action to improve one’s working 
conditions. Thus, the Board recognizes that when employees 
discuss terms and conditions of work, even when they may 
be critical and complaining, they act in concert with each 
other.48 The Board should clarify that any discussion 
between employees is necessarily collective and concerted.49 
 
46 See Int’l Transp. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 449 F.3d 160, 166 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (holding that an individual employee picketing to have union 
represent only herself was not engaged in concerted activity). 
47 Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at *4–5 
(Dec. 14, 2012) (Hayes, Member, dissenting) (arguing that employees who 
defended their quality of work on Facebook were not engaged in mutual 
aid or protection but in “mere griping”). 
48 See id. at *2; Mobil Expl. & Producing U.S., Inc. v. NLRB, 200 F.3d 
230, 238 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that employee’s statements to co-workers 
regarding an investigation of the union president resulting from 
employee’s prior complaints were concerted and not “mere griping” 
because they were attempts to have the co-workers join the employee in 
opposing the union president). 
49 Rinke Pontiac Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 239, 242 (1975) (holding that an 
employee’s complaints to insurance representative that he was receiving 
less compensation under a new incentive program were concerted activity 
raising shared concerns of all the salesmen and were not simply voicing a 
personal gripe); Lou’s Transp., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 158, at *1–2, *11 
(Dec. 16, 2014) (rejecting the argument that discussion about working 
conditions was mere gripe or expression of personal discontent); Ellison 
Media Co., 344 N.L.R.B. 1112, 1113 (2005) (holding conversation between 
two employees about reporting supervisor’s offensive comment to 
management was concerted). Contra Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 
F.2d 683, 684–85 (3d Cir. 1964) (stating that where one employee advises 
another, who listens, with the motive only to advise as to what can 
individually be done to protect the other’s working status, then that is 
more likely “mere griping” and not preliminary discussions that might 
result in group action); Adelphi Inst., Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 1073, 1073 (1988) 
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Of course, by its very nature, social media is social and 
not intended to work as a private diary. For this reason, 
most employees are linked to at least some co-workers, and it 
will not often occur that an employee using social media is 
not acting in concert with other employees through social 
media. However, if the post is not visible to co-workers and is 
only visible to other family and friends, who may be 
customers or clients of the employer, then the post might be 
a mere gripe, such as a worker who posts, “Manager acting 
like a jerk again today.” 
The term “mere griping” is sometimes used by the Board 
to describe individual action.50 “Mere griping” connotes an 
individual who is complaining about something at work to 
blow off steam but is not engaging co-workers in a 
conversation. In social media cases, different Board members 
have different thoughts about what constitutes mere 
griping.51 The Board should clarify that “mere griping” can 
happen only where one employee acts alone.52 The Board’s 
 
(holding that one employee asking another employee if he had ever been 
placed on probation was not concerted activity because it was a “purely 
personal” inquiry); Parke Care of Finneytown, Inc. d/b/a Daly Park 
Nursing Home, 287 N.L.R.B. 710, 710–11 (1987) (holding that speaking to 
co-workers about discharge of another employee not protected concerted 
activity because no “group action of any kind [was] intended, 
contemplated, or even referred to” (quoting Mushroom Transp., 330 F.2d 
at 685)); Asheville Sch., Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. 877, 881 (2006) (reasoning that 
employee who disclosed co-workers’ wage rates to other employees was 
engaged in mere griping). 
50 See, e.g., Meurer, Serafini & Meurer, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1373, 1378 
(1976) (noting that employee did not enlist or seek support of co-workers 
before sending a letter to his employer seeking higher wages); NLRB v. 
Office Towel Supply Co., 201 F.2d 838, 841 (2d Cir. 1953) (holding that 
“mere griping,” without more, did not constitute protected concerted 
activity, the first instance of a court utilizing the term “mere griping”). 
51 See, e.g., Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at *4–5 (Hayes, 
Member, dissenting) (arguing that employees who defended their quality 
of work on Facebook were not engaged in mutual aid or protection but in 
“mere griping”). 
52 Rinke Pontiac, 216 N.L.R.B. at 242 (holding that employee’s 
complaints to insurance representative that he was receiving less 
compensation under a new incentive program was engaged in concerted 
activity raising shared concerns of all the salesmen and was not simply 
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earliest cases mentioned griping synonymously with 
complaining and did not use the terminology “mere griping” 
to deprive employees speaking to each other of the protection 
of the Act.53 In fact, in Washington Aluminum Co., the 
Supreme Court rejected an employer’s argument that 
employee complaints about a lack of heat were mere griping 
and thus unprotected.54 The Circuit Courts, rather than the 
Board, first introduced the concept of “mere griping” as being 
insufficient to constitute concerted activity. Unfortunately, 
several Circuit Court opinions implied that conversations 
 
voicing a personal gripe); Lou’s Transp., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 158, at *1–2, *11 
(rejecting argument that discussion about working conditions was mere 
gripe or expression of personal discontent); Ellison Media, 344 N.L.R.B. at 
1113 (holding that conversation between two employees about reporting 
supervisor’s offensive comment to management was concerted); Pontiac 
Osteopathic Hosp., 284 N.L.R.B. 442, 453 (1987) (“In short concerted 
activity for the purpose of mutual aid or protection has to start 
somewhere, and for the protection of the Act to mean anything such 
activity must be protected at the start . . . .”). Contra Mushroom Transp., 
330 F.2d at 684–85 (stating that where one employee advises another, who 
listens, with the motive only to advise as to what can individually be done 
to protect the other’s working status, then that is more likely “mere 
griping” and not preliminary discussions that might result in group 
action); Adelphi Inst., 287 N.L.R.B. at 1073 (finding that one employee 
who was placed on probation asking another employee if he had ever been 
placed on probation was not concerted activity because it was a “purely 
personal” inquiry); Daly Park Nursing Home, 287 N.L.R.B. at 710–11 
(holding that speaking to co-workers about discharge of another employee 
not protected concerted activity because no “group action of any kind [was] 
intended, contemplated, or even referred to” (quoting Mushroom Transp., 
330 F.2d at 685)); Asheville Sch., 347 N.L.R.B. at 881 (reasoning that 
employee who disclosed co-workers’ wage rates to other employees was 
engaged in mere griping). 
53 See, e.g., Interlake, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 1043, 1052 (1975) (“Section 7 
confers the right to ‘gripe’ to a labor organization even if the gripe be an 
individual one.”); Block-Friedman Co., 20 N.L.R.B. 625, 631–33 (1940) 
(rejecting employer’s argument that employee was terminated because the 
employee was always griping, and instead finding employee’s activity to be 
protected union activity). 
54 NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14–15 (1962) (rejecting 
company’s contention that repeated complaints about cold working 
conditions prior to a walk-out were “the same sort of gripes as the gripes 
made about the heat in the summertime”). 
LEVINSON – FINAL 
No. 2:303] SOLIDARITY ON SOCIAL MEDIA 319 
among employees were not concerted if the employees were 
merely griping.55 These decisions were not adopted by the 
Board on remand. The Board in Meyers II does in dicta 
affirmatively mention Mushroom Transportation, a Third 
Circuit case, stating that when one employee speaks and 
another only listens, something more than mere griping is 
required to constitute concerted activity.56 Meyers II, 
however, focuses on a situation where one employee 
complained on his own to an outside agency about an unsafe 
truck he had to drive. There were no facts raising the issue 
of whether discussion among employees is concerted.57 
Furthermore, even in a circumstance where one employee 
complains to non-co-workers, the employee may be engaging 
in concerted activity. For instance, while not linked to co-
workers on social media, the employee might post to 
complain to a government official, a union representative, or 
the media.58 Imagine an employee who has many friends and 
family who are union organizers and representatives and 
 
55 Mushroom Transp., 330 F.2d at 685; Office Towel Supply Co., 201 
F.2d at 841. 
56 Meyers Indus. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986) (citing 
Mushroom Transp., 330 F.2d at 683). 
57 Id. at 885–87 (attempting to define when the act of a single 
employee is or is not “concerted” and emphasizing that the employee at 
issue in the case did not “at any relevant time or in any manner” join 
“forces with any other employee”). 
58 Kinder-Care Learning Ctrs., Inc., 299 N.L.R.B. 1171, 1171 (1990) 
(“[T]he Board has found employees’ communications about their working 
conditions to be protected when directed to other employees, an employer's 
customers, its advertisers, its parent company, a news reporter, and the 
public in general.”) (citations omitted). M.V.M., Inc., 352 N.L.R.B. 1165, 
1172 (2008) (holding that security officer’s complaint about working 
conditions to government official in charge of court marshal services was 
protected); Every Woman’s Place, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 413, 413, 420 (1986), 
enforced, 833 F.2d 1012 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding social worker’s call to 
Labor Department concerted because other employees had questioned the 
employer’s holiday pay practices); Salisbury Hotel, Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. 685, 
687 (1987) (finding employee’s call to the U.S. Department of Labor 
concerted, even though employees had not explicitly agreed to act 
together, because they had agreed they did not like a new lunch policy and 
should approach management about the policy). 
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who posts on Facebook: “looking more and more like we need 
to do some organizing at my workplace.” That type of post 
may be an individual acting as a representative of co-
workers or may result from a logical outgrowth of prior 
discussions among co-workers, and the Board would have to 
examine the factual circumstances to make the 
determination. 
The Board should more clearly enunciate these principles 
underlying its determinations about when social media 
activity is concerted. The fact that posts to social media are 
intended to be shared by others including co-workers is the 
underlying rationale for finding that “liking” a co-worker’s 
post is concerted activity.59 It sets the groundwork for 
potential future action by raising awareness about the issue 
and by discussing it, both preliminary to any collective 
action. 
Adding to the confusion about what is concerted and what 
is “mere griping” is that the Board sometimes attaches the 
inquiry to whether an activity is for mutual aid and 
protection, rather than to whether it is concerted.60 As the 
next Part discusses, clarifying that the relevant inquiry for 
whether conduct is for mutual aid and protection focuses on 
whether it relates to terms and conditions of employment, 
and not whether it is intended to improve conditions of work 
or is instead mere griping, will alleviate this confusion that 
has arisen in social media cases. 
IV. MUTUAL AID AND PROTECTION 
In many cases involving communications between 
employees on social media, it will be apparent that the 
employees are acting to improve their working conditions, 
 
59 See Three D, LLC, d/b/a Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, 361 
N.L.R.B. No. 31, at *3 (Aug. 22, 2014) (finding no contest to ALJ’s finding 
that employee who liked Facebook post by a co-worker engaged in 
concerted activity). 
60 See, e.g., Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 
*4–5 (Dec. 14, 2012) (Hayes, Member, dissenting) (arguing that employees 
who defended their quality of work on Facebook were not engaged in 
mutual aid or protection but in “mere griping”). 
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and thus engaged in mutual aid or protection. In some cases, 
however, the link between the communications and a goal of 
improved working conditions may be less clear. To dispose of 
these types of cases more easily and to provide guidance for 
employers and employees about these types of cases, the 
Board can clarify its test for “mutual aid or protection” by 
explaining that communications about terms and conditions 
of employment are for mutual aid and protection. 
The landmark Supreme Court case regarding the test for 
mutual aid and protection, Eastex, was decided in 1978.61 
The issue in that case was whether employees who 
distributed a union newsletter that advocated taking action, 
such as letter-writing and voting, on legislative matters 
concerning employment, such as “right to work” and 
minimum wage laws, were engaged in concerted activity for 
mutual aid or protection. In its discussion of the issue, the 
Supreme Court held that such conduct was for mutual aid 
and protection and that the Act specifically used the 
terminology “for mutual aid and protection,” rather than 
only the terms “collective bargaining” and “grievance 
settlement,” so that a wide range of conduct related to terms 
and conditions of employment would be protected.62 The 
Court focused on the idea that a broad range of conduct 
“outside the immediate employee-employer relationship” 
intended to improve terms and conditions of employment, 
such as by means of administrative and judicial forums and 
by lobbying the legislature, were for mutual aid and 
protection.63 The Court acknowledged that “some concerted 
activity bears a less immediate relationship to employees’ 
interests as employees than other such activity.”64 The 
Court, however, left the determination to the Board as to 
when concerted activity had such a weak link to terms and 
conditions of employment as to no longer constitute acting 
for mutual aid and protection.65 
 
61 Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 564–67 (1978). 
62 Id. at 565–67. 
63 Id. at 565. 
64 Id. at 567. 
65 Id. at 570 n.20. 
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Often, the Board does not separately analyze whether an 
employee’s conduct is for mutual aid and protection or 
whether it is concerted.66 When it does analyze these issues 
separately, the Board has at times stated the tests for 
activity constituting mutual aid and protection differently. 
The Board has asserted that concerted activity is for mutual 
aid and protection when the objective goal is to improve the 
terms and conditions of employment.67 On the other hand, 
the Board has asserted, even in the same case, that there 
need only be “a link between the activity and matters 
concerning the workplace or employees’ interests as 
employees.”68 The latter interpretation is supported by the 
Board’s reason for rarely addressing mutual aid and 
protection separately. The Board explains that employees 
rarely complain to their employer about matters not related 
to terms and conditions of employment and employers rarely 
discipline employees for complaints unrelated to 
employment.69 The Board has explained that employees who 
express disapproval of supervisors for reasons related to 
working conditions, training, safety, and discipline do so for 
mutual aid and protection, while employees who criticize the 
ultimate direction of the business and related managerial 
decisions do not.70 For example, when employees threatened 
to strike unless a newly appointed acting director was 
replaced, the Board held that they acted for mutual aid and 
protection. The employees needed quality supervision to 
ensure that funding for their positions was not lost.71 
The Board has also held that employees who distribute 
“purely political” leaflets do not do so for mutual aid and 
 
66 See, e.g., Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 81, at *1 (July 3, 
2012); Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 248 (1997). 
67 See Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Mkt., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 12, at 
*3 (Aug. 11, 2014). 
68 Id. 
69 See Senior Citizens Coordinating Council of Riverbay Cmty. Inc., 
330 N.L.R.B. 1100, 1103 (2000) (quoting Lutheran Soc. Serv. of Minn., 250 
N.L.R.B. 35, 41 (1980)). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1104. 
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protection.72 In Firestone Steel Products Co., union-
represented employees were distributing leaflets that 
evaluated candidates for the Michigan Supreme Court and 
the U.S. Senate. Because the leaflets did not relate to 
concerns about the workplace, the concerted activity was not 
for mutual aid or protection.73 The Board has clearly stated, 
however, that when concerted activity does pertain to terms 
and conditions of employment, the activity is for mutual aid 
and protection, even where one employee solicited the help of 
other employees who acted only as witnesses and were not 
similarly affected by the offending working condition.74 In 
order for the “solidarity principle” underlying the protections 
of Section 7 to work, the Board recognizes that “solicited 
employees have an interest in helping the aggrieved 
individual—even if the individual alone has an immediate 
stake in the outcome—because ‘next time it could be one of 
them that is the victim.’”75 
Like the Board, the Circuit Courts have also stated 
slightly different tests for whether concerted activity is for 
 
72 Firestone Steel Prods. Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 826, 826 (1979). In another 
case, the Board held that concerted activity was not for mutual aid and 
protection where employees proposed a stock option plan to purchase the 
employer’s parent corporation. Harrah’s Lake Tahoe Resort Casino, 307 
N.L.R.B. 182, 182 (1992), modified, 325 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1992). The Board 
held the proposal did not relate to “employees’ interests as employees.” Id. 
The Board held it related to who managed the business rather than to 
their terms and conditions of employment. Perhaps in a case where 
employees were proposing to purchase the employer company rather than 
a parent corporation, the Board will recognize how directly issues 
involving ownership and employee management affect terms and 
conditions of employment. Certainly the connection is more direct than 
that of lobbying the legislature regarding employment statutes recognized 
as protected concerted activity in Eastex. See supra notes 61–65 and 
accompanying text. 
73 See Firestone Steel, 244 N.L.R.B. at 826–27. 
74 Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Mkt., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 12, at *5 
(Aug. 11, 2014). 
75 Id. at *6 (citation omitted), overruling Holling Press, Inc., 343 
N.L.R.B. 301, 303–04 (2004) (holding that a lone sexual harassment victim 
did not act for mutual aid and protection when seeking support of a co-
worker). 
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mutual aid and protection. The D.C. Circuit, to which all 
Board decisions may be appealed, has focused on the 
relationship between the activity and matters regarding 
employment.76 The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, has 
focused on whether the concerted activity is geared at 
improving terms and conditions of employment.77 Because of 
this focus, the Fourth Circuit has held that complaints about 
management are not for mutual aid and protection. For 
example, in one case the employer had provided ice cream to 
employees in celebration of a new contract with a supplier.78 
When several employees criticized this manner of expressing 
appreciation for employees, the Fourth Circuit held they 
were not acting for mutual aid or protection because they did 
not seek to improve working conditions.79 
The Board’s failure to state a clear test for mutual aid 
and protection has created confusion and has resulted in a 
focus on whether online activities are geared towards 
improving working conditions rather than on whether they 
relate to terms and conditions of employment. The Board can 
make the rules clearer, which will aid employers and 
employees in their understanding of when social media posts 
are for mutual aid and protection. The Board should clarify 
that Eastex and subsequent Board precedent recognize 
conduct as being for mutual aid and protection when it 
relates to terms and conditions of employment, even if not 
stating an explicit goal to improve working conditions. The 
rationale is that some discussion is a prerequisite to actually 
discussing and taking action precisely aimed at improving 
working conditions. For instance, employee discussions 
regarding wages are well established as concerted activity 
for mutual aid and protection.80 On the other hand, some 
 
76 See Ampersand Publ’g, LLC v. NLRB, 702 F.3d 51, 55–56 (D.C. Cir. 
2012); Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. NLRB, 484 F.3d 601, 606–07 
(D.C. Cir. 2007). 
77 See New River Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 945 F.2d 1290, 1294 (4th Cir. 
1991). 
78 Id. at 1292. 
79 Id. at 1295. 
80 Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. 638, 638 (1982). 
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topics, such as political campaigning unrelated to workplace 
objectives, bear only a remote relationship to terms and 
conditions of employment, and, thus, discussions on those 
topics are not for mutual aid and protection. 
One way to support the Board’s interpretation that 
mutual aid or protection includes discussion of terms and 
conditions of employment rather than requiring some higher 
level of demonstrated intent to act together is through expert 
testimony of psychologists, sociologists, and other social 
scientists. Social science suggests that current employees are 
reluctant to testify against their employer in favor of another 
employee, particularly if that employee has been 
terminated.81 The Board, however, is prohibited by the 
NLRA from hiring economists and has interpreted this 
prohibition to apply to all social scientists.82 Were the Board 
to modify its interpretation of this statutory prohibition to 
permit the hiring of psychologists and other non-
 
81 John D. Sloan, Jr. & John Graves, Age Discrimination: A Trial 
Lawyer’s Guide for Bringing Suit (Employment Law), TRIAL, Mar. 1995, at 
48, 50 (“[P]eople who still work for the defendant may be reluctant to tell 
all they know because they may fear losing their jobs.”); Susan Bisom-
Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in 
Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 1028 
(1999); NOAH J. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., YES!: 50 SCIENTIFICALLY PROVEN WAYS TO 
BE PERSUASIVE 105–06 (2008) (“[I]t’s too often the case that employees are 
reluctant to disagree with their managers, nurses are hesitant to question 
their supervising doctors, and first officers defer to their aircraft’s 
captains.”); HUGH S. HANNA, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF 
LABOR, BULLETIN NO. 211, LABOR LAWS AND THEIR ADMINISTRATION IN THE 
PACIFIC STATES 51–52 (1917) (discussing how employees in antitrust cases 
are frequently “unwilling to testify in court against their employers”); 
Kara L. Haberbush, Note, Limiting the Government’s Exposure to Bid 
Rigging Schemes: A Critical Look at the Sealed Bidding Regime, 30 PUB. 
CONT. L.J. 97, 113 (2000) (“Past employees may also be reluctant to testify 
for fear of being blackballed if they are still working in the industry.”). Cf. 
STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 92, 
123, 141–42 (Harper Perennial 2009) (1974) (describing a shock 
experiment demonstrating people’s willingness to obey authority figures). 
82 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012); Catherine 
L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: 
Problems with its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 
DUKE L.J. 2013, 2078–79 (2009). 
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economists,83 the Board would be able to include social 
science’s perspective in its decisions, and in its memoranda, 
including guidance for employers and employees. Expert 
opinions in the Board’s guidance would make it easier for 
employers and employees to understand the rules. Including 
expert opinions in decisions would clarify these decisions84 
and help provide rationale to the Circuit Courts that review 
the Board’s decisions. 
V. LOSS OF PROTECTION 
Another topic that warrants further explanation by the 
Board is which test it will use to determine when an 
employee’s social media conduct is so egregious that it loses 
the protection of the Act. The Board has stated several times 
that it will not apply its Atlantic Steel test to social media 
posts because they do not involve face-to-face conversations 
with a supervisor or manager.85 Atlantic Steel is a four-factor 
test that the Board has historically applied to situations 
where an employee gets upset while speaking with a 
 
83 Fisk & Malamud, supra note 82, at 2078–79 (arguing the Board 
should modify its interpretation and be prepared to defend the 
modification in court and congressional oversight hearings); Samuel 
Estreicher, Improving the Administration of the National Labor Relations 
Act Without Statutory Change, 5 FLA. INT’L UNIV. L. REV. 361, 373 n.41 
(2010) (arguing that Section 4(a) does not prohibit the Board hiring 
“individuals with statistical expertise . . . to help it conduct regulatory 
compliance reviews”). 
84 Cf. 1 JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD: A STUDY IN ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE LAW 176 
(1974) (discussing how during the 1930s the NLRB’s Economics Division 
“carried on two interrelated types of work: it gathered economic material 
as evidence for use by the board in particular cases and it made general 
studies of labor relations problems to guide the board in its formulation of 
policy”); JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD: NATIONAL LABOR POLICY IN TRANSITION 265 (1981) 
(discussing how the lack of empirical evidence to support decisions 
undermines the legitimacy of NLRB decisions). 
85 Three D, LLC, d/b/a Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, 361 N.L.R.B. 
No. 31, at *4 (Aug. 22, 2014), enforced, Three D, LLC v. NLRB, 2015 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 18493, at *3 (2d Cir. 2015); Pier Sixty, LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 
59, at *2 (Mar. 31, 2015). 
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supervisor, or when an employee denigrates a supervisor to 
other employees while within earshot of a supervisor.86 The 
Board considers (1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject 
matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the outburst; and 
(4) whether the outburst was provoked by an employer’s 
unfair labor practice.87 Because the employee is speaking 
about a supervisor, the Board considers whether or not the 
statement was made in private and whether the 
communications would disrupt production or undermine 
shop discipline.88 For instance, in one case, an employee of 
an automobile dealer became angry while meeting with 
supervisors in a manager’s office. The employee swore at the 
manager and pushed away a chair. The employee also 
threatened the manager that the manager would regret 
firing him. The Board applied the Atlantic Steel factors to 
determine that the employee’s behavior was not so egregious 
as to lose the protection of the Act.89 In another case, the 
Board applied these same factors to determine that the 
employee’s conduct was egregious enough to lose 
protection.90 In this case, the employee described a 
supervisor to another employee as “that bitch” and told 
another employee to show a union organizing e-mail to her 
“fucking supervisors.” The Board reasoned that because the 
employees were working in cubicles in “close proximity to 
each other occupied by both supervisory and nonsupervisory 
personnel,” the employee’s statements tended to undermine 
“the authority of the supervisor[s] subject to his vituperative 
attack[s].”91 
 
86 Triple Play Sports Bar, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31, at *4. 
87 Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979). 
88 NLRB OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL 
COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES, MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, at 5–
6, 12 (Aug. 18, 2011) [hereinafter AUGUST MEMORANDUM]; Felix Indus., Inc. 
v. NLRB, 251 F.3d 1051, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
89 Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. No. 117, at *2–3 (May 28, 2014). 
90 Cellco P’ship d/b/a Verizon Wireless, 349 N.L.R.B. No. 62, at *3–4 
(Mar. 28, 2007). 
91 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp., 344 
N.L.R.B. 1324 (2005)). 
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The Board should clarify whether Atlantic Steel will be 
applied when a social media post is intended for a supervisor 
or manager. For instance, imagine a situation where an 
employee posts a statement about his boss, “Bruce, you can 
just fuck off. I am defriending you,” after a work dispute has 
arisen. While similar to a face-to-face situation, the comment 
may or may not be seen by co-workers. Furthermore, the 
situation is different because it is not face-to-face, and thus 
is less likely to interfere with production and discipline. A 
social media post is also less likely to be perceived as a 
physical threat.92 The Board should clarify whether a social 
media post will be evaluated under the Atlantic Steel test 
when the post is specifically directed to a supervisor, and, if 
not, which other standard might apply. 
When Atlantic Steel does not apply to social media, there 
are four other potential standards the Board may use to 
determine whether the activity has lost the protection of the 
Act. In previous cases, the Board has applied the Jefferson 
Standard test, the Linn test, and a totality-of-the-
circumstances test.93 Additionally, one Board member has 
suggested adopting a test mirroring the baseline issue of 
whether the employee’s conduct was “so egregious as to take 
it outside the protection of the Act, or of such a character as 
to render the employee unfit for further service.”94 
 
92 But see Felix Indus. v. NLRB, 251 F.3d 1051, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(rejecting the Board’s holding that the nature of the outburst only 
balances toward losing the protection of the Act when the employee’s 
outburst is “flagrant, violent, or extreme” and stating that “denouncing a 
supervisor in obscene, personally-denigrating, or insubordinate terms” 
weighs against protection). 
93 Three D, LLC, d/b/a Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, 361 N.L.R.B. 
No. 31, at *4–5 (Aug. 22, 2014) (applying the Jefferson Standard test for 
disloyalty and disparagement and the Linn test for defamation); Pier 
Sixty, LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, at *2–3, *27 (Mar. 31, 2015) (applying 
the nine-factor totality-of-the-circumstances test). 
94 Richmond Dist. Neighborhood Ctr., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 74, at *2 n.6 
(citing Triple Play Sports Bar, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31, at *11 n.1 
(Miscimarra, Member, dissenting)). 
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Jefferson Standard is a test normally applied when 
employees make statements to third parties.95 It determines 
whether an employee has been disloyal or disparaged an 
employer’s product to an extent that the employee loses the 
protection of the Act, even if engaged in otherwise protected 
concerted activity.96 The Ninth Circuit summarized the 
inquiry as “at base a question of whether the employees’ 
efforts to improve their wages or working conditions through 
influencing strangers to the labor dispute were pursued in a 
reasonable manner under the circumstances.”97 “Product 
disparagement unconnected” to a labor dispute, “breach of 
important confidences, and threats of violence” are generally 
deemed unreasonable.98 On the other hand, statements “that 
a company’s treatment of its employees may have an effect 
upon the quality of the company’s products” or “the 
company’s own viability” are not generally unreasonable.99 
For instance, in one case, the Board adopted the ALJ’s 
decision that employees did not lose the protection of the Act 
by sending a letter to their newspaper employer’s advertisers 
“seeking support” during collective bargaining.100 The ALJ 
reasoned that asserting circulation was plummeting was 
 
95 AUGUST MEMORANDUM, supra note 88, at 8. 
96 NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers 
(Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 473 (1953). 
97 Sierra Pub’g Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 220 (9th Cir. 1989). See 
also Five Star Transp., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(finding that letters to a school district that contracted with bus company 
where employees had been employed “were reasonably necessary to carry 
out their lawful aim of safeguarding their then-current employment 
conditions”). Cf. Endicott Interconnect Tech., Inc. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 532, 
537 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding that employee who wrote newspaper 
concerning layoffs and was then warned not to disparage the company but 
posted comments on the paper’s website was unprotected when his 
comment had made “a sharp, public, disparaging attack upon the quality 
of the company’s product and its business policies at a critical time for the 
company”). 
98 Sierra Publ’g, 889 F.2d at 220. 
99 Id. 
100 Sierra Pub’g Co., 291 N.L.R.B. 540, 541 (1988), enforced, 889 F.2d 
at 220. 
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mere hyperbole; questioning the continued viability of the 
newspaper did not render the communication unprotected.101 
The Board applied the Jefferson Standard test to a social 
media case where employees posted comments critical of 
their manager on Facebook.102 In Triple Play Sports Bar, the 
Board determined that employees were not disloyal when 
they referred to a manager as an “asshole” and “liked” a 
former employee’s statement about the manager making an 
accounting error resulting in the employee owing state tax.103 
Consistent with long-standing use of Jefferson Standard, the 
Board emphasized that the comments, which related to an 
ongoing labor dispute about the taxes, were not directed at 
the public, did not mention or disparage the employer’s 
product, and were similar to comments a customer could 
overhear.104 
Linn is the standard used to determine whether 
statements are defamatory when a labor dispute is 
involved.105 It uses the heightened standard normally 
associated with proving defamation of a public figure or 
celebrity. Under the Linn standard, merely making a false 
statement is not sufficient to prove defamation; rather, an 
employee’s statement will be defamatory only when it is 
made with malice, meaning the statement was uttered “with 
knowledge of its falsity, or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was true or false.”106 Only when a statement is 
made with malice will the employee lose the protection of the 
Act. The Board applied the Linn standard in a social media 
case where an employee posted statements complaining that 
 
101 Id. at 549. 
102 Three D, LLC, d/b/a Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, 361 N.L.R.B. 
No. 31, at *6–7 (Aug. 22, 2014). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. See also N.Y. Party Shuttle, LLC, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 112, at *5 
(May 2, 2013) (holding that even if statements about lack of benefits were 
“slightly off,” they disparaged only working conditions and not the 
employer’s product). 
105 Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 
53, 64–65 (1966). 
106 Id. at 61. 
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the employer had not issued paychecks in a timely fashion 
and did not provide specified benefits.107 The ALJ, whose 
decision was adopted by the Board, reasoned first that the 
statements were true, and that even if the statement about 
the benefits was not precisely accurate, it did not rise to the 
level of being intentionally false and misleading.108 Thus, the 
employee retained the protection of the Act in making the 
statements. 
The third test used by the Board in social media cases is a 
totality-of-the-circumstances test.109 For this test, the Board 
assesses nine different factors: 
(1) whether the record contained any evidence of the 
[employer’s] antiunion hostility; (2) whether the 
[employer] provoked [the employee’s] conduct; 
(3) whether [the employee’s] conduct was impulsive 
or deliberate; (4) the location of [the employee’s] 
Facebook post; (5) the subject matter of the post; 
(6) the nature of the post; (7) whether the [employer] 
considered language similar to that used by [the 
employee] to be offensive; (8) whether the employer 
maintained a specific rule prohibiting the language 
at issue; and (9) whether the discipline imposed upon 
[the employee] was typical of that imposed for similar 
violations or disproportionate to [the] offense.110 
The Board applied this test to a social media case 
involving an employee who used profanity in reference to his 
manager and urged co-workers to vote to join a union.111 In 
Pier Sixty, the Board held that all nine factors suggested 
 
107 N.Y. Party Shuttle, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 112, at *5; see also Triple 
Play Sports Bar, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31, at *6 (holding that employees’ social 
media comments were either opinions or statements of fact that were not 
maliciously untrue). 
108 N.Y. Party Shuttle, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 112, at *5. 
109 A search for these factors in the Board decisions disclosed no case 
where this nine-factor test was applied prior to Pier Sixty. 
110 Pier Sixty, LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, at *2 (Mar. 31, 2015). 
111 Id. at *2–4. 
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that the social media comment had not lost the protection of 
the Act.112 
The dissenting member in Pier Sixty advocated for 
application of the Atlantic Steel test rather than the nine-
factor totality test, arguing that the nine-factor test is more 
malleable and leaves more room for members’ biases to affect 
the outcome.113 The Board majority, however, emphasized 
that Atlantic Steel’s factors focus on a situation where an 
employee speaks directly with a supervisor and are not 
suited to address comments made to other employees in non-
work settings.114 
The Board should clarify whether all three tests can be 
applied to the same social media activity to make 
determinations of whether such activity loses protection of 
the Act for three different reasons, such as disloyalty, 
defamation, and overall egregious conduct, or whether the 
totality-of-the-circumstances test supersedes the Linn and 
Jefferson Standard tests. Perhaps the totality-of-the-
circumstances test should be applied when neither disloyalty 
nor defamation is found, in which case it should be used 
consistently in every social media case where the employer 
argues that protection of the Act was lost because of the 
employee’s egregious conduct. 
Finally, at least one Board member has endorsed a fourth 
test: whether the employee’s conduct was “so egregious as to 
take it outside the protection of the Act, or of such a 
character as to render the employee[s] unfit for further 
service.”115 It is unclear if this is the overall conclusion based 
on a totality-of-the-circumstances test, such as the nine-
factor test, or a different test that simply inquires as to the 
 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at *5 (Johnson, Member, dissenting). 
114 Id. at *2. 
115 Richmond Dist. Neighborhood Ctr., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 74, at *2 
(Oct. 28, 2014) (alteration in original) (citing Neff-Perkins Co., 315 
N.L.R.B. 1229, 1229 n.2, 1233–34 (1994)); Three D, LLC, d/b/a Triple Play 
Sports Bar & Grille, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31, at *9 n.1 (Aug. 22, 2014) 
(Miscimarra, Member, dissenting). 
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bottom-line issue.116 In some cases, the Board has applied 
this “so egregious” test without further elaboration.117 In 
others, the Board has looked at the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether the employee’s conduct 
was so egregious as to lose the protection of the Act.118 The 
Board should clarify that for social media cases it is not 
using the “so egregious” test as a bottom-line test without 
further guidance. Rather, a conclusion about whether the 
employee’s conduct was so egregious as to render the conduct 
unprotected should be based on the totality of the 
circumstances, as evaluated using the nine-factor test or 
other factors, which should be enumerated. 
VI. DISCLAIMERS 
The Board has made clear, both in the context of social 
media and other policies, that a disclaimer that merely 
states that the policy does not deprive employees of their 
rights under federal law or the National Labor Relations Act 
will not suffice.119 The Board affirmed an ALJ’s reasoning 
 
116 See Pier Sixty, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, at *2 (adopting the ALJ’s use 
of a totality-of-the-circumstances test and applying nine-factor totality 
test). The Pier Sixty panel also cites to Richmond District, 361 N.L.R.B. 
No. 74, at *2 n.6, as a case where “the Board, without deciding the 
appropriateness of the judge’s test for analyzing private Facebook 
conversations, examined the egregiousness of the conduct under all the 
circumstances.” Id. 
117 See, e.g., Allied Aviation Fueling of Dall., LP, 347 N.L.R.B. 248, 
248 n.2 (2006) (concluding that employee’s action of signing another 
employee’s name, without authorization, on a grievance form was not so 
egregious as to lose the protection of the Act); Hahner, Foreman & 
Harness, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 1423, 1424–25, 1428–29 (2004) (reasoning that 
an impulsive remark to supervisor about slowing down in reaction to 
reduced wages was not so egregious as to lose the protection of the Act). 
118 See, e.g., Roemer Indus., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 96, at *9 (May 28, 
2015) (looking at the totality of the circumstances but noting that Board 
precedent is unclear as to whether Atlantic Steel or a totality-of-the-
circumstances test should apply in particular types of cases). 
119 Alternative Cmty. Living, Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 55, at *1, *19 
(Mar. 31, 2015) (analyzing disclaimers in the social media context). See 
also Tower Industries Inc. d/b/a Allied Mech., 349 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1077 n.1 
(2007); Ingram Book Co., 315 N.L.R.B. 515, 516 (1994). 
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that with such a disclaimer, employees will not know what 
their rights are under the Act, and that they should not have 
to risk punishment for running afoul of an employer’s policy 
to find out.120 
The Board has suggested that savings clauses that are 
more explicit, limited to clarifying a particular provision, and 
that affirmatively notify employees of the “panoply of rights” 
guaranteed to them by Section 7, may be effective.121 For 
instance, in one case finding a disclaimer ineffective, the 
Board acknowledged that “an employer’s express notice to 
employees advising them of their rights under the Act may, 
in certain circumstances, clarify the scope of an otherwise 
ambiguous and unlawful rule.”122 However, the Board has 
not yet actually ruled that a particular affirmative 
disclaimer of this type has been effective in rendering lawful 
an otherwise unlawful and overly broad employer policy.123 
The NRLB General Counsel’s office also has indicated 
that an affirmative disclaimer will be effective to make an 
otherwise overbroad provision in a social media policy 
lawful.124 In a March 2015 memorandum, the General 
Counsel found lawful a prohibition in a social media policy 
that prohibited making recordings of work areas, given that 
an adjacent disclaimer clarified that “[a]n exception . . . 
would be to engage in activity protected by the National 
Labor Relations Act including, for example, taking pictures 
of health, safety and/or working condition concerns or of 
 
120 Alternative Cmty. Living, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 55, at *2, *19. 
121 See First Transit, Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at *3–4 (Apr. 2, 2014) 
(finding savings clause ineffective where it mentioned only freedom to vote 
for or against a union without employer interference and was not 
integrated with the unlawful overbroad employer policies contained in the 
employer handbook ten pages earlier). 
122 Id. at *3. 
123 An extensive search, including shepardizing both Ingram Book Co. 
and First Transit, Inc., discloses no such case. 
124 NLRB OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, REPORT OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL 
CONCERNING EMPLOYER RULES, MEMORANDUM GC 15-04, at 8, 20–21, 27 
(Mar. 18, 2015). 
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strike, protest and work-related issues and/or other 
protected concerted activities.”125 
If the General Counsel’s office is not pursuing charges 
that claim a social media policy with an affirmative 
disclaimer is unlawful, then such a case will not reach the 
Board easily. For employers who wish to use savings clauses, 
it would be helpful to have additional guidance from the 
Board itself as to the requirements for an effective disclaimer 
in various clauses of a social media policy. It would be 
helpful for the Board to explicitly address this issue in the 
next case in which it is raised, rather than simply adopting 
the ALJ’s decision as it sometimes does. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For decades, the NLRB has applied its precedent to 
protect employees’ demonstrations of solidarity regarding 
their working conditions. The NLRB has faithfully applied 
this long-standing precedent to cases involving the use of 
social media. Contrary to widely publicized assertions, the 
resultant rulings are easy enough for employees and 
employers to comply with and understand. 
Employers cannot discipline employees for engaging in 
protected concerted activity on social media. When 
employees discuss terms and conditions of employment via 
social media they are protected by the NLRA. Likewise, 
when one employee posts comments to social media that 
follow up on opinions about terms and conditions of 
employment that were previously voiced in group meetings, 
the NLRA protects that employee. 
Employees’ posts remain protected even if they are 
critical of supervisors, as long as they do not disparage their 
employer’s products. They also generally remain protected 
even when involving profanity. Moreover, comments on 
social media about terms and conditions of employment that 
employees believe are truthful are also protected and do not 
rise to the level of unprotected defamation. Posts directly 
advocating acts of insubordination, such as refusal to follow 
 
125 Id. at 27. 
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lawful employer policies and neglect of duties, however, will 
lose the protection of the Act. 
As for adopting a lawful social media policy, employers 
should ensure that the policy cannot be reasonably construed 
by employees to prohibit protected concerted activity. 
Prohibitions on sharing personnel or confidential 
information are unlawful if they do not clarify that 
employees may share information about wages and other 
terms and conditions of employment. Social media policies 
must define any prohibition on disparagement and 
defamation precisely enough to clarify that such conduct 
does not include statements critical of supervisors or 
management. Additionally, social media policies must permit 
employees to post anonymously when discussing wages and 
other terms and conditions of employment. 
By following these relatively straightforward rules, 
employers can ensure that they are not interfering with 
employees’ right to act in concert over terms and conditions 
of employment. A few clarifications about how the long-
standing precedent applies to social media cases will make 
the NLRB’s regulation of employee behavior and employer 
social media policies even easier to understand. 
The Board should clarify that any social media discussion 
among employees is necessarily concerted and that “mere 
griping” can happen only when one employee acts alone. 
Even when an employee acts alone, however, by posting to 
social media not visible to co-workers, a line must be drawn 
between a mere gripe, such as “manager acting like a jerk 
again today,” and concerted activity. When an employee 
posts a statement for third parties and is representing other 
employees, following up on group employee activity, or 
seeking to induce future group employee activity, the post 
remains protected.  
The Board should also clarify its test for “mutual aid or 
protection” to explain that social media communications 
about terms and conditions of employment are for mutual 
aid and protection. Only when communications are about 
topics remotely linked to working conditions, such as 
criticism of the ultimate direction of a business unrelated to 
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any dispute over working conditions or solicitation to support 
a political candidate unrelated to workplace objectives, are 
they no longer for mutual aid and protection. Because 
discussion is a prerequisite to taking actual action aimed at 
improving working conditions, even social media comments 
not explicitly advocating improvement are for mutual aid 
and protection. If the Board would modify its interpretation 
of the statutory prohibition on hiring economists to permit 
the hiring of psychologists and other non-economists, these 
experts could attest to the importance of discussion and 
solidarity as a prerequisite to future action. 
The Board should further explain which tests it uses in 
which circumstances to determine whether an employee’s 
conduct on social media is so egregious as to render it 
unprotected. The Board should clarify that it will not use 
Atlantic Steel in any situation involving social media posts, 
even where the communication is specifically directed to a 
supervisor, and further explain the underlying rationale 
about why social media posts are different from face-to-face 
conversation. The Board should also clarify in which 
circumstances it will use the Jefferson Standard test, which 
is normally used when an employee makes disparaging or 
disloyal comments to a third party, the Linn test, which is 
normally applied to defamatory statements, and the nine-
factor test, which was applied in Pier Sixty, a recent case 
involving an employee who posted profane statements about 
his manager on social media in the course of urging co-
workers to vote for a union. 
Finally, the Board should clarify its policy on disclaimers 
in social media policies. The Board has made clear that a 
general disclaimer in a social media policy that states that 
the policy is not intended to deprive employees of their rights 
under the NLRA will not render an otherwise unlawful 
policy lawful. The Board should further clarify whether a 
specific provision within a social media policy may be lawful 
due to a disclaimer. Employers and employees would benefit 
from clarification as to whether an explicit disclaimer, 
limited to clarifying a particular provision of a social media 
policy and affirmatively notifying employees that they have 
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the right to discuss terms and conditions of employment, 
renders an otherwise overbroad provision lawful. 
If the Board makes these explicit clarifications, the 
Circuit Courts likely will continue to enforce the Board’s 
decisions in cases involving social media. The Board will 
thus continue to assure protection for employees’ 
demonstrations of solidarity regarding their working 
conditions, whether by face-to-face communication, social 
media, or some means of communication resulting from 
future technological revolutions. 
